

# KULTŪROS TEORIJA IR METODOLOGIJA



G. Suraučiūtė. Kaligrafija „Inversija Nr. 1“, 2019, popierius, tušas, 34 × 70 cm

# Archetypal History of Mentalities: Searching for Paradigms

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The aim of the article is to create a system of concepts, methods, and assumptions, which could become paradigms of one of the directions of mentality research. Mentality in the article is considered as a psychic constitution of an individual or a group of people. The main element of this constitution is a mentality feature. Groups of people with the same mentality features make up imagined communities. The notion of archetype plays an important role in describing the differences that exist between different communities. Archetypes are treated in the article as very typical examples or a model of something, as the content of collective imagination. Changes in mentalities are analysed through the concepts of unconscious, creative energy, imagined worlds, tensions, events, and compensation. The article states that the main reason for the change in mentalities is people's creative activity, which in turn consists of the conscious efforts of the creator and the creative energy that lies within the collective unconscious. The main source of creative energy is tensions, the key regularity regulating changes in tensions – compensations. Some of the concepts of system theory are applied when analysing the trends in mentality change. In this case, the assumption is made that society is a system of the various imagined communities that make it up.

**Keywords:** Carl Gustav Jung, mentalities, archetypal history, paradigms, tensions, compensation.

## Introduction

Despite numerous and undisputable achievements, the existence of the history of mentalities as an independent scientific discipline is constantly questioned<sup>1</sup>. One of the reasons for this is the absence of paradigms. That is why Peter Burke's work on the strengths and weaknesses of the history of mentalities proposed a greater

concern with categories, schemata, formulae, stereotypes, or paradigms. The works of Aby Warburg and Ernst Gombrich on art, Thomas Kuhn on science, and Michel Foucault on a variety of topics should act as examples. The author pointed out that all four scholars have drawn inspiration from one form or another of psychology<sup>2</sup>. This article attempts to create a paradigm of mentality history that draws inspiration

1 See Darnton, R. *The Kiss of Lamourette. Reflections in Cultural History*; Lloyd, G. *Demystifying Mentalities*.

2 Burke, P. *Strengths and Weaknesses in the History of Mentalities*.

from Carl Gustav Jung's psychology. The notion of archetype has played a key role in the views of this scientist.

Depending on how the archetype is perceived, at least three directions of the use of this term in historical studies can be distinguished. First, archetypes are a very typical example of a person or thing<sup>3</sup>. In this sense, the history of archetypes is the history of typical and very typical personalities. Each nation has had very typical personalities at each stage of its history, and these personalities represented the nation or part of it. Whatever made one or another personality typical or very typical, how they were similar, and what made them different from the typical personalities of other nations or times – these are the key issues in this field of research.

The Cambridge dictionary of the English language defines archetype as an original model of something from which others are copied<sup>4</sup>. Two variants of this “something” are the most interesting from the perspective of the history of mentalities: model societies and model, or exemplary persons. In the first case, the history of archetypes is the history of various models of public society, their origin, development, decline, role as individuals, as well as the life of societies. In the second case, the history of archetypes is the history of the personalities who were exemplary, i.e. those who others tried to imitate, or at least admired. If by studying typical and very typical personalities we find out what kind of society it was, by studying exemplary model persons we learn what kind of society it *wanted to be*.

<sup>3</sup> Oxford's English dictionary.

<sup>4</sup> Cambridge English Dictionary.

And, finally, archetypes are the contents of the collective imagination. According to Jung, these contents may appear as certain mythological motifs, typical behaviour, typical feelings, or typical forms of apprehension<sup>5</sup>. In any case, archetypes are the causes of behaviour of human beings as a biological species and, in this sense, “they are patterns of instinctual behavior”<sup>6</sup>.

The concept of archetypal history was first used by Kevin Lu in his work on the concept of “Jungian” history. As we know, Jung distinguishes two components of history: objective and natural. Objective history – that which we make, the natural history that resides in and emanates from the collective unconsciousness and only discloses its living presence through the medium of creative fantasy<sup>7</sup>. According to Lu, what Jung terms as natural history could be designed as archetypal history<sup>8</sup>. In our view, this concept can be applied not only to the Jungian viewpoint but also to the independent direction of scientific research. Archetypal history is a field of research that analyses the role of archetypes, or in a broader sense, the role of the collective unconsciousness in the process of history. Archetypal history of mentalities – a direction in the study of mentalities, analysing the role of archetypes in mentality structure and change

Paradigms are generally perceived as a framework of concepts, results, and

<sup>5</sup> Gray, R. M. *Archetypal Explorations: An Integrative Approach to Human Behavior*; Lindenfeld, D. Jungian archetypes and the discourse of history.

<sup>6</sup> Jung, C. G. *Collected Works*, vol. 9.1, p. 44.

<sup>7</sup> Jung, C.G. *The Collected Works*. Vol. 10, p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> Lu, K. *Jung and History*, p. 16.

procedures within which subsequent work is structured<sup>9</sup>. At the same time, it provides model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners<sup>10</sup>. The main model problems in the field of mentality research can be worded as follows: what is mentality? what types of mentalities can be distinguished? what are the dynamics of mentalities? what patterns or tendencies of mentality dynamics can be distinguished? This article is an attempt to consider and present some solutions to these problems. We are not sure that it is a successful attempt, but we are certain that without such attempts, the paradigms of the history of mentality will never be created.

## 1. Structure and types of mentalities

### *Concept of mentality feature*

Mentality is the mental constitution of an individual or a group of individuals. Depending on what parts of the psyche are singled out and what relationships between them are postulated, many different theories of mentalities can be developed. The mentality parts most often referred to are attitudes of ordinary people to everyday life, thinking, feelings and beliefs<sup>11</sup>. In this article, the underlying concept describing the structure of mentalities is the concept of a *mentality feature*. A mentality feature is the type of thinking, feelings, attitudes and beliefs inherent in individuals or large groups. Mentality in this sense comprises

the entirety of mentality features characteristic of an individual or a group.

The simplest way to identify the mentality feature of any individual or group of people is by how they behave in typical situations. In typical situations, behaviour specific to certain groups of people can be called a typical behaviour. Typical behaviour is recurring, recognisable behaviour. It is recurring because people in a similar situation have acted in a similar way before. It is recognisable because there are certain algorithms for this behaviour.

Let us consider a typical behaviour such as attending religious services. Why do people go to church and attend Mass? There are at least three ways to answer this question. First, someone can go because they do not want to stand out among their neighbours, who attend church regularly. They would much rather stay at home and watch TV, but then they would need to explain to their neighbours what prevented them from attending Mass, they would have to lie and evade questioning, so it is simply easier to go and participate in an event that is of no interest to them. The reason for such participation is a rational decision. Likewise, someone can go to church because they enjoy organ music and choir singing. And, finally, someone can attend Mass because they are devout persons. The reasons for this typical behaviour – a rational decision, desire to listen to organ music and choir singing, piety – are the mentality features of the people going to church. In other words, a mentality feature is a mental structure, the existence of which we postulate in order to explain the typical behaviour of individuals or groups of people.

9 Blackburn, S. *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*.

10 Kuhn, T. *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, p. 10.

11 Hutton, P. *The History of Mentalities: The New Map of Cultural History*; Hulak, F. *En avons-nous fini avec histoire des mentalités?*

The introduction of the concept of mentality into the study of mentalities is useful because it provides an opportunity to *reduce to a common denominator* the mentalities of different peoples and time periods. In the initial phase of the study of mentalities, it is enough to find out what people once thought in regards to one question or another, what they felt or how they behaved in certain situations. A typical example of such a study is Dinzelbacher's *Europäische Mentalitätsgeschichte*<sup>12</sup>. In a very schematic way, the content of this book can be expressed as assertions in the manner of "Europeans in Antiquity thought that...and in the Middle Ages – that..., while in the Early Modern Period acted and felt this way, and in the Modern Era – differently", etc. This research direction can go on into infinity, adding new topics to the research and specifying the research object. The difficulties begin when we want to compare the results of this study with the mentalities of other civilisations, such as, say, the Chinese. In this case, if we do not want to content ourselves with claims like "medieval Europeans thought that... and the medieval Chinese thought that...", we need to create a system of concepts that can be applied to the study of the mentalities of different times and peoples. One of these would be the concept of mentality features. Using this concept, instead of saying, "Europeans thought that..., while the Chinese – that...", we could talk about the *mentality features* of the Europeans and Chinese, and analyse their similarities, differences, dynamics, and so on.

12 Dinzelbacher, P. (dir.) *Europäische Mentalitätsgeschichte*.

### *Main types of mentalities*

The numerous and different mentality features can be classified somehow. Pitirim Sorokin provided the best-based classification of mentalities that we know of. According to him, there are three ways of knowing reality: either through the senses, through faith, or through rational thought. In this context, he identified three types of cultural mentalities: sensate, ideational, and mixed-idealistic<sup>13</sup>. In this work, we will classify mentalities according to the role of imagination in people's lives and distinguish four types of mentalities: instinctive, rational, idealistic, and ideational (or based upon faith).

The instinctive type includes people whose lives are most often driven by instincts; primarily the pursuit of pleasure or, more broadly, a comfortable life. Imagination in the lives of this type of people does not play any or barely any role. People who are of the rational type try to use their minds to solve their life problems. The main feature of this type of mentality is rational choice. In order to make the right choice, people create different options in their imagination and consider the consequences of each one. An idealist is a person who cherishes or pursues higher principles, purposes, goals, etc. Ideas are creations of the imagination, so people of the idealistic type live more in their imagination than in a world perceived by the senses. Some of the content of collective imagination is considered to be the right one, not requiring and often avoiding any rational evidence by ideational type of mentality. Some of the features of the *true*

13 Sorokin, P. *Social and Cultural Dynamics*.

believers' mentality are revealed in Eric Hoffer's book<sup>14</sup>.

A particular species of idealistic human beings is archetypal people. In this case, archetypes are perceived as co-impulsive ideas. An idealistic person can cherish some ideas, or they might not. They can also pursue some high, noble goals, or they may reject them. Archetypal people cannot reject the source of compulsivity, because they are complex. Archetypes are the content of collective unconscious, and appear as complexes in individual unconscious<sup>15</sup>.

The emergence of some complexes can be explained by the biographies of complex humans: someone nearly drowned as a child, which is why they are afraid of water; someone had too warm or too cold relations with their parents, so they feel uncomfortable with individuals of the opposite sex, etc. However, there are complexes that affect not only separate individuals, but also groups of people. The origins of these complexes are difficult and often impossible to explain through the biographies of the people who experience them. What biographical facts can explain the emergence of complexes such as conscience, duty, or loyalty? We can almost always explain why one person has a conscience, but this won't say anything about the emergence of the phenomenon of conscience itself – because the origins of some complexes lie not in the history of the individual, but in the history of humanity.

The main feature of complexes is autonomy<sup>16</sup>. This means that to a greater or lesser

extent the mental part of complex people consists of mental contents, and they can monitor rather than control the operation. This does not mean that a complex person cannot control their behaviour. For example, a person complexed in respect to representatives of another race may behave as if racial differences unfaze them, but subconscious indignation or, conversely, admiration of the external features, demeanour, and lifestyle of someone of another race would not disappear. A responsible person might not perform their duty, but they cannot voluntarily give up the feeling of duty, or, conversely, "turn it on".

#### *The concept of an imagined community*

People with the same mentality features or belonging to the same type form certain communities. Sometimes members of such a community are united by some sort of mentality feature – for example, sports fans are united by love for and pride in their team, which is manifested in the fact that during a match they meet at the stadium and support their favourite team in various ways; at times, a community – such as Catholics – has a set of behaviours, feelings, perceptions, and even thinking which, as much as possible, is upheld by every member of the Catholic community. Since members of these communities are far from each other in space and time, the concept of an imagined community can be used to describe them<sup>17</sup>. This is what we will use instead of the concept of "collective", as favoured by some authors<sup>18</sup>.

14 Hoffer, E. *The True Believer: Thoughts On The Nature Of Mass Movements*.

15 Jung, C. G. *Collected works*. Vol. 9.1, p. 42.

16 Jung, C. G. *Collected Works*. Vol. 18, p. 73.

17 Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.

18 Chartier, R. *Cultural History between Practices and Representations*; Burke, P. *Strengths and Weaknesses in the History of Mentalities*.



G. Surauciūtė. Fragmentas (240 × 45 cm) iš darbo „Poema tušui“, 2017, popierius, tušas, 600 × 45 cm

Each society is made up of a wide variety of imagined communities. In order to investigate the mentality of a society, we need to analyse the mentalities of the specific people living in that society, and on the basis of the results of this analysis, identify and/or label the imagined communities that make up that society.

#### *Identification and labelling*

It is easiest to identify a community based on how its members behave (feel, think) in a typical situation. For example, people who work hard from morning to evening form an imagined community of *toilers*, obedient people – a community of those who are *obedient*, those ready to challenge are *challengers*, etc. If any community has not yet been named, the researcher identifies it. Orlando Figes, for example, found that in Stalin's Russia people used to only whisper about political matters, so he called the Russian community of that period “whisperers”<sup>19</sup>. There are as many imagined communities as there are groups of people acting in a typical manner.

The next step is research into the causes of typical behaviour. How can we determine what kind of mentality was the cause of one or another typical behaviour?

First, evidence of the causes that led to their behaviour can be found in the dia-

ries, memoirs, and autobiographies of the people themselves. For example, Trotsky argues in his biography that sympathy for the down-trodden and indignation over injustice played a leading role in choosing a revolutionary path<sup>20</sup>. Another source is the testimony of other historical figures. For example, Stalin's former secretary Boris Bazhanov said that Stalin's main motive after the October Revolution was the desire to take power<sup>21</sup>. It is hardly necessary to mention that in both cases the evidence is not that the mentioned mentality features really played a decisive role in the lives of these historical personalities, but statements along the lines of “as Trotsky claimed,...according to Bazhanov...” And, finally, the historian analyses the evidence that has survived in archives and determines in what cases and what mentality features have determined the behaviour, feelings and lifestyle of people who lived in another time.

Art, primarily literature, plays an important role in identifying which imagined communities exist in a society. From artwork we can learn what typical behaviour, typical feelings, ways of perception or thinking existed in one society or another, what kind of people were involved

<sup>20</sup> Trotsky, L. *My Life*.

<sup>21</sup> Bazhanov, B. *Ja byl sekretariom Stalina*.

<sup>19</sup> Figes, O. *The Whisperers: Private life in Stalin's Russia*.

in these forms and why, and what reasons encouraged or forced them to behave in a typical way. In other words, literature and art provide the imagined mentalities that we can use in restoring the mentalities of actual people who once lived. Many literary heroes have their own prototypes, but even in cases where such prototypes do not exist, they exhibit some of the mentalities of actual human beings. In addition, literary heroes often become very typical and exemplary persons. For example, Molière's *Tartuffe* is a very typical representative of an imagined hypocritical community, and the hero of Goethe's novel *The Sorrows of Young Werther* became an exemplary personality for those who kill themselves for tragic love. The names of literary heroes are labels, which mark certain ways of typical behaviours, feelings, perceptions, and thinking.

Thus, history is not only a history of nations – French, German, or Indonesian; not only social or professional groups – peasants, nobles, soldiers, traders, workers; it is the history of people united by common mentalities – heroes, cowards, hypocrites, challengers, adapters, fighters, and those seeking peace; this is also the story of Oedipus, Hamlets, *Trainspotters*<sup>22</sup> or the *Dharma Bums*<sup>23</sup>; some of these communities, such as hypocrites, existed almost always and everywhere, some – such as *Dharma Bums* – only in certain nations at certain stages of their history. Identifying these communities and researching their role in history is the main task of this direction of mentality history.

22 See Welsh, I. *Trainspotting*.

23 See Keruouc, R. *Dharma Bums*.

As an example, we will examine Lithuanian society in the Soviet era. It is easiest to divide it into two groups: those who opposed the Soviet occupation and those who adapted to it<sup>24</sup>. According to Kęstutis Girnius, it is necessary to add a third imagined community – collaborators<sup>25</sup>. Even more in-depth analysis of society provides an opportunity to talk about fighters, creators, careerists<sup>26</sup>, socialist romantics<sup>27</sup>, as well as true believers and combiners<sup>28</sup>. All these communities played a key role not only in the history of Lithuania, but also in the history of other nations.

Consider such a mentality feature as Trotsky's aforementioned sympathy for the down-trodden and indignation over injustice. In order to explore the role of this mentality feature in history, we need to answer the following key questions. How and when sympathy for the down-trodden and indignation over injustice was formed in the collective subconscious of Tsarist Russia (and not only there)? In Christianity, there is an archetype of neighbourly love that encourages one to help others ("the good Samaritan"). How did neighbourly love and helping others develop into compassion for a part of society that encourages the murder of another part of that same society? What works of art or

24 Zalatorius, A. *Priklausomybės metų (1940–1990) lietuvių visuomenė: Pasipriešinimas ir/ar prisitaikymas*.

25 Girnius, K. *Pasipriešinimas, prisitaikymas, kolaboravimas*.

26 Subačius, R. *Dramatiškos biografijos: kovotojai, kūrėjai, karjeristai, kolaborantai*.

27 Davoliūtė, V., *The Making and Breaking of Soviet Lithuania: Memory and Modernity in the Wake of War*.

28 Juknevičius, S. *Tarp instinktų ir archetipų: lietuvių mentalitetų kaita antroje XX a. pusėje*.

historical documents reflect this transformation? When and where did sympathy for the down-trodden and indignation over injustice unite an imagined community? What were the typical and very typical (archetypal) individuals of this community? Did this community have exemplary individuals, and if so, who? In what historical events were they involved, and what role did members of this community play? These and similar questions can be raised with regard to all imagined communities.

## 2. Dynamics of mentalities

### *Unconscious and nature*

The main reason for changes in mentality is the creative activity of people. Every scientific discovery, new social or political theory, artwork, changes people's attitudes towards the world, themselves, creates new forms of behaviour and new mentality features. In addition to the conscious efforts of the creator, certain subconscious powers that they can hardly control also play a larger or smaller role in the creative process. If we call this power "nature", we can say that, in addition to the creator himself, nature takes part in the creative process and the bigger its role in creation, the better the results that can be expected. A genius is a man through whom, according to Kant, nature gives a rule to art<sup>29</sup>. What Kant and other modern philosophers described as nature, Jung called the unconscious. "The Unconscious is nature, and nature never lies"<sup>30</sup>

The main feature of the unconscious is creativity<sup>31</sup>. The creative nature of the

collective unconscious is expressed by the means of creative personalities – thinkers, artists, mystics<sup>32</sup>. The main instrument of expression of the creative unconscious is imagination<sup>33</sup>. The result of creation – imagined worlds. We often talk about artists' imagined worlds, but this can also be applied to imagined religious, moral, ideological worlds.

### *The structure and functions of imagined worlds*

The main structural elements of the imagined worlds are archetypes, symbols, myths. Archetypes are *a priori* conditions for imagination, which are somewhat similar to the kantian categories<sup>34</sup>. Similar to the Kantian categories that arrange the material of senses into a coherent picture of the world, archetypes arrange imagination-generated contents into imaginary worlds.

*Symbolon* (Greek) – that which is hidden. Depending on how the hidden part of the symbol is perceived, two types of symbols can be distinguished. In the first case, symbols are perceived as signs. The main field of the use of these symbols is science. To comprehend such a symbol, you need to know its meaning. In the second case, symbols express certain feelings behind them. That is, using Paul Tillich's terminology, "living symbols"<sup>35</sup>. The same sensory objects might not mean anything to someone, yet serve as a sign for someone else, and a symbol for yet another person. For example, someone may pass by a monument to a national hero and

29 Kantas I. *Sprendimo galios kritika*, p. 161.

30 Jung C. G. *Collected works*. Vol. 18, p. 166.

31 Jung C. G. *Collected works*. Vol. 11, p. 336.

32 Jung C. G. *Collected works*. Vol. 10, p. 10.

33 *Ibid.*

34 Jung C. G. *Collected works*. Vol. 10, p. 11.

35 Tillich, P. *Theology of Culture*.

see it as an ugly block of stone, but it may also be a sign of the state's wish to preserve the historical memory of the nation; meanwhile, someone looking at this monument may experience certain archetypal feelings: pride in their nation, its glorious past, honourable individuals, etc. For them, the monument is only a stimulus that activates archetypes in their unconscious. In this sense, symbols are imprinted archetypes.

The third element of the imagined worlds is myths. Myths give meaning to imagined worlds, embed a person's life into a certain social or ontological context. As Rollo May puts it, "myths are like the beams in a house: not exposed to outside view, they are the structure which holds the house together so people can live in it."<sup>36</sup>

History as a whole is the history of imagined communities that believe in the same myths, worship the same symbols, or are affected by the same archetypes. Becoming members of these communities is not a result of deliberate efforts. No one can, by simply wishing, begin or stop believing in a myth, fall in love, or, conversely, stop loving their homeland or start to experience a thrill in relation to some religious symbol. This means that history is not a performance in which everyone chooses whatever role they want. History is a performance whose director is the collective unconscious or nature. Nature, with the help of creative personalities, creates imagined worlds and shapes the mentalities of the people living on those worlds: some are turned into true believers, others – into fighters, obedient ones, and so on.

<sup>36</sup> May, R. *The Cry for Myth*, p. 15.

This conception of the process of history opens up two main fields of research: first, it is possible to study the origin and development of imagined religious, mythological, ideological worlds. A good example of such a study is *The birth of Purgatory*<sup>37</sup>. Another direction is to analyse how imagined worlds shaped the mentalities of the people who lived in them. Among the work done in this area are those of Georges Duby and Joachim Fest. In his work Duby focused on the development of ideologies within the structures that permeated the various aspects of an individual's life<sup>38</sup>. The work of Fest is significant for the history of mentalities for two main reasons. First, it distinguishes the main imagined communities that formed Nazi society: practitioners and technicians, functionaries, technicians, intellectuals, etc. Second, it reveals the values, attitudes, and worldviews of those communities – in other words, their mentalities. And, finally, the book analyses the relationship between the imagined and the real world, or, in Fest's words, the "idea and the reality of the Third Reich"<sup>39</sup>.

In his book, Fest also explores the psychological causes of fascism. Why was fascist ideology, or, in a broader sense, an imagined fascist world, formed? In the context of the problems we are dealing with, this question can be formulated as follows: why do some imagined worlds change others? In order to understand the change of the imagined worlds better, we are going to add the concepts of *psychic energy* and *tensions*.

<sup>37</sup> Le Goff, J. *The birth of Purgatory*.

<sup>38</sup> Dubois, G. *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*.

<sup>39</sup> Fest, J. *The Face of the Third Reich. Portraits of the Nazi Leadership*, p. xi.



G. Suraučiūtė. *Fragmentas* (180 × 45 cm) iš darbo „Poema tušui“, 2017, popierius, tušas, 600 × 45 cm

### *Psychic energy and tensions*

According to Jung, all psychological phenomena can be considered as manifestations of energy<sup>40</sup>. The source of psychic energy is tension – primarily, the tension between instincts and archetypes<sup>41</sup>. As archetypes form the framework of imagined worlds while the world of an instinctive person is most often limited to sensory perception, we will consider tension between the imaginary world and the sensory world as the main source of mental as well as creative energy.

The role of tension in the life of individuals and society can be briefly described as follows: A human being, as a biological creature, lives in the world of instincts. Unsatisfied instincts cause tension or psychological and, sometimes, physiological discomfort. The individual tries to satisfy the instincts and so reduces the tension that they cause. In this sense, the researchers who consider the satisfaction of needs and reduction of tensions as the primary goals of human activities<sup>42</sup> are correct). However, the end of evolution of the human being as a biological creature was followed by the evolution of imagination; a human

being, as a creature with imagination, must always create tensions because tensions are the main source of mental energy. These tensions can get different expressions in different areas of theoretical and practical activities, however, the process of creating tensions as such is endless. Religions mostly focus on the tension between temporary and eternal life or morals, that is the tension between good and evil, while social life is driven by tensions existing between different classes, castes, parties and groups. According to Ralf Dahrendorf, the imagination of societies that creates tensions and antagonisms seems to be endless<sup>43</sup>. Once the goals existing in the imagination of societies are achieved or alternatively prove to be unrealistic, this type of tension fades away. At this point, somebody's imagination gives birth to new ideas which get objectivised in new mythologies, religions and philosophies which, in turn, create new imaginary worlds where new mentality features get formed and so on ad infinitum. The main law governing this process is compensation. Compensation prevents a single religion, ideology, or philosophy from dominating in the world.

40 Jung C. G. *Collected works*. Vol. 8, p. 247.

41 Jung C. G. *Collected works*. Vol. 8, p. 206.

42 See Brown, B. *Instincts and tension*.

43 Dahrendorf R. *Der moderne soziale Konflikt: Essay zur Politik der Freiheit*.

### *The role of compensation*

The introduction of the concept of compensation into mentality research is useful because it provides a better understanding of the process of changing mentalities. From where, for example, did dissidents appear in a totalitarian state like the Soviet Union? According to the authorities, it was the result of hostile propaganda and therefore the Committee for State Security (KGB) in every way prevented Western information from entering the country. Now, let us imagine that the Iron Curtain was airtight and no information from the West could reach the population of the Soviet Union. Does this mean that the USSR would have been a monolithic society in which there would be no alternative or even hostile attitudes? Not at all. First, alternative models of society could be created by the mind. Czesław Miłosz referred to the way of thinking that existed in socialist societies as “the captive mind”<sup>44</sup>. Indeed, the body can be captive, yet the mind is always free. Nothing will ever prevent the mind from creating different models of the world, of society’s development. In a totalitarian society, most such models would never see the light of day, but sooner or later there would be a challenger that would dare to make their views public. Similarly, someone’s imagination would create alternative forms of behaviour, feeling, or perception, and there would be people who would not be afraid to introduce these forms to the public. The law of compensation states that a model that compensates for the shortcomings of the existing regime is what will be widespread in society. If pleasures prevail in society,

44 Miłosz Cz. The Captive mind.

then challengers will introduce ideas; if the society is dominated by ideas, then challengers will urge people to pay more attention to sensory pleasures. This is because humans are biological, social, transcendental beings, and any extreme activates the compensation mechanism. As Jung put it, “too much of the animal distorts the civilized man, too much civilization makes sick animals”<sup>45</sup>.

### *The role of events*

In order to track the concepts of tension and compensation for the analysis of the development of society, we should introduce its measure. In our view, such a measure could be an event. An event is an action that has a beginning and end. Some historical events are the result of the deliberate efforts of the people who planned and involved them, but this is rather an exception than a rule. Who, for example, planned and executed the French Revolution? After all, such “spontaneous” events best reflect the processes taking place in one or another society.

By applying the concept of event to the study of mentality dynamics, we can assume that the greater the tension in society, the more energy it generates, and the more energy it generates, the more events occur. It is also true in terms of social and political life: the more stress they face in society, the more significant events they bring about.

The concept of event may also be applied to the measurement of compensation. It is expedient to distinguish between constructive, destructive and neutral events. The goal of constructive events is the creation or consolidation of a new order, destructive – destruction of the existing order.

45 Jung, C. G. Collected Works. Vol. 7, para. 32.



G. Surauciūtė. *Fragmentas* (240 × 45 cm) iš darbo „Poema tušui“, 2017, popierius, tušas, 600 × 45 cm

Neutral events expand and diversify the repertoire of typical behaviours, feelings, or perceptions that already exist. The analysis of the relationship between compensation and events may be based on the assumption that the greater the need to compensate for any disadvantages in existing society, the more destructive events there are in it.

Another premise that can be useful in researching mentality dynamics is that both constructive and destructive events occur when a certain amount of energy is stored in the unconscious. This means that the unconscious plays a kind of safe box role in which it accumulates long-lasting feelings, wishes, expectations, or hopes and, when the time comes, they burst to the surface. Yes, one of the causes of the French Revolution was the unjust, humiliating treatment of the common people by the aristocrats. According to Thomas Carlyle, dishonesty will accumulate, moreover, it will reach a head<sup>46</sup>. This is true not only in terms of injustice or other negative emotions, incentives, but also in relation to all mental content.

Taking into account the above assumptions, the main problems arising in this direction of research can be formulated as follows. What events testify to the existence of tensions? Which communities create and/or maintain tensions? What destruc-

<sup>46</sup> Carlyle, Th, *The French Revolution: A History*, p. 31.

tive events are typical of the society being analysed? What disadvantages did these events seek to compensate for in that society? Are there facts showing that one or another event was the result of collective subconscious processes? If so, what facts? These and other issues arising from them were analysed in some works<sup>47</sup>, but most of them are still waiting for their researchers.

Thus, the change of mentalities is the change of imagined worlds and imagined communities. Can any trends be identified in these changes? One of the methods used to investigate this problem could be a systematic approach.

### 3. Systematic approach

The idea of using a systematic approach in history is not new. Ludwig von Bertalanffy asks, beyond a description of what happened, is theoretical history possible? If so, it should be an investigation of systems – of human groups, societies, cultures, civilisations, or whatever the appropriate term of reference may be<sup>48</sup>. In our case, the

<sup>47</sup> See Megill A. History's unresolving tensions: reality and implication; Luigi, Z., and Donald, W. (eds). *Jungian Reflections on September 11: A Global Nightmare*; Juknevičius S. *Komunistinio Aukso amžiaus mito ištakos ir raidos ypatybės*.

<sup>48</sup> Bertalanffy, L. von. *Organismic Psychology and Systems Theory*, p. 59.

appropriate term of reference is an imagined community. Society is a system in which communities characterised by various mentalities behave, think and feel in a typical way in certain typical situations. We will take a look at some of the features of this system.

The mentality system is an open system because it has external interaction. The main difference between the mentality system and social systems is that it is open not only to social changes but also to changes taking place in the imagination. If the theory of social structuralism – say, that functionalism strongly emphasises the pre-eminence of the social world over its individual parts (i.e. its constituent actors, human subjects)<sup>49</sup>, then archetypal mentality history accentuates the role of collective imaginations in people's lives.

The system of mentalities is an adaptive system. The adaptive mentality system is peculiar in that a person is forced to adapt not only to constantly changing external conditions – climate change, the emergence of new means of communication, economic and financial crises, etc., but also to the constantly changing content of the collective imagination. Whether a person wants it or not, likes it or not, their unconscious keeps sending them new contents of the imagination. Some pass through their psyche without leaving any trace, some they are forced to take into account in their daily activities, some become part of works of art, and some – philosophical and social political theories. These theories presume certain typical situations and forms of typical behaviour.

And, finally, the mentality system is

dynamic. In order to better understand the dynamics of the mentality system, we will introduce the concepts of scope and the structure of mentality. The scope of mentality is the totality of the mentality features of an individual or group of people. The structure of mentality is the order of the mentality features. Analysis of the relationship between the scope and structure of mentalities may be based on the assumption that the scope of mentalities is of a constant finite size.

This assumption draws on the fact that a human being is limited in time. As there are only 24 hours in a day and 365 days in a year, the range of typical behaviour is not unlimited. Each action takes place at the cost of other actions. If a person goes to mass, he or she cannot be in a swimming pool at that time; if he or she watches TV, he or she is unable to participate in a political campaign, etc. The more time that an individual spends on any single type of typical behaviour, the less time remains for him or her to pursue other activities. That means that the sum of typical behaviour does not change, only its structure changes. Since typical behaviour is a result of mentality, it is also true for mentality features.

This assumption follows the conclusion that the change in mentalities is a change of structure. If new mentality features develop, they push out the old ones, and if one mentality feature begins to dominate, it happens at the expense of other features. This premise provides an opportunity to analyse trends in the change of mentalities.

Sorokin developed a theory, which is known as the “pendular theory of social change”. He considers the course of history to be continuous, though irregular, fluctuat-

49 Giddens, A. *The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration*.

ing between two basic kinds of cultures: the “sensate” and the “ideational” through the “idealistic”. According to him, in the mid-20th century, the sensate culture reached its apogee and should now transform into the idealistic culture<sup>50</sup>. This is the weakest point in Sorokin’s theory. Eighty years after creation of the theory, there is no evidence of an idealistic rebirth, or the chances of it are weak<sup>51</sup>.

If a change of mentality is to be seen as a change in structure, then the theory of cultural fluctuation becomes unnecessary. In this case, the development of Western culture can be seen as a constant shift towards an instinct-based culture, in other words, towards rational and instinctive mentalities. However, the rationale for this hypothesis requires further research<sup>52</sup>.

## Conclusions

The role of the paradigms in mentality research depends on the concepts of para-

digms and mentality as well. Depending on the researcher’s goals and tasks, four stages of the study of mentalities can be distinguished. In the first phase, the researcher investigates what they perceive or define as a mentality. The next step in the study of mentalities is classification. If we do not want to write as many mentality histories as there once lived people, we somehow have to classify all the possible mentalities. The third stage of mentalities research is the research of dynamics. The article is based on the assumption that the main reason for the change of mentalities is the creative activity of people. The fourth stage attempts to reveal the trends in the change of mentalities. If we apply a systematic approach to the analysis of these trends, we will have to introduce new concepts and formulate new assumptions in addition to the previous ones. Of course, it is possible to dwell on any of the stages listed above, but the more fully, and at the same time more accurately, we want to describe the structure and change of mentalities, the more concepts we will have to use, and the more complex the methods.

<sup>50</sup> Sorokin P. *Social and Cultural Dynamics*.

<sup>51</sup> Mangone, E. *Social and Cultural Dynamics. Revisiting the Work of Pitirim A. Sorokin*.

<sup>52</sup> Juknevičius S. *Creativity, Unconscious and Mentalities: a Systematic Approach*.

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